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<On the Kinds of Supposition according to Walter Burley>2 
[Introduction] 
(1) (p. 31) (1.1) “Some things that are said are said with complexity, 
and others are said without complexity.”3 Those that are said without com-
plexity are, for example, ‘man’, ‘animal’. Those that are said with complexity 5 
are, for example, ‘A man runs’, ‘An animal runs’.4 
(2) It is plain from this that the incomplex is part of the complex. And 
because a knowledge of the part is very helpful for knowing the whole, 
therefore in this treatise we must talk about incomplex [expressions] and the 
properties of incomplex [expressions] — that is, about supposition and ap-10 
pellation. For the knowledge of these is very helpful for knowing the 
proposition, and consequently for knowing the syllogism. 
(3) ‘Incomplex’ in this discussion is taken not only for a simple word, 
as the term ‘man’ or the term ‘animal’ is [simple]. Rather ‘incomplex’ in this 
discussion is taken for anything that can be an extreme5 in a proposition, 15 
whether it is an extreme put together out of an adjective and a substantive or 
whether it is an extreme put together by means of conjunction6 or by means of 
disjunction.7 
(4) (1.2) It is [my] intention to treat briefly the kinds of supposition 
and appellation. (These are the properties of terms in propositions.) But before 20 
we talk about the kinds of supposition, let us see which terms supposit and 
which ones do not supposit. 
[Which terms have supposition?] 
(5) You have to know that a part of an extreme does not have sup-
position. Rather supposition belongs to the whole extreme. Thus, an inference 25 
need not be valid because of a relation between parts of the extremes. 
                                                 
2Here and throughout this translation, pointed brackets enclose Brown’s editorial 
additions. My own insertions are enclosed in square brackets. 
3Aristotle, Categories 2, 1a16–17. 
4Latin has no indefinite article, so these sentences might also have been translated 
‘Man runs’, ‘Animal runs’. Throughout this translation, I have added or omitted indefinite 
articles as seemed to me to fit the sense best. Readers should feel free to renegotiate them. 
5An “extreme” or an “extreme term” is the subject or predicate of a proposition. 
6‘Conjunction’ = copulatio. Here the term has nothing to do with the “copula” of the 
proposition, as it often does. Instead it refers to the ‘and’-operator that produces “copulative” 
(= conjunctive) propositions. 
7Presumably Burley doesn’t mean to exclude “simple words” from being 
“incomplexes,” but only to emphasize that “incomplexes” are not confined to simple words. 
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(6) It is plain from this that the inference ‘You are running to the inn; 
therefore, you are existing at the inn’8 is not valid. For even though ‘running’ 
is inferior to9 ‘existing’, yet the extreme ‘running to the inn’ is not inferior to 
the (p. 32) extreme ‘existing at the inn’. 
(7) Nevertheless, I am not saying that an inference is never valid 5 
where there is a relation [of inferiority and superiority] between the parts of 
the extremes. I am saying rather that one should not conclude that an infer-
ence is valid because of a relation between parts of the extremes. For ‘You are 
seeing a man; therefore you are seeing an animal’ is a good inference. Here 
there is a relation [of inferiority and superiority] between the parts. But the 10 
inference does not hold because of this, but only because of the relation 
between the [whole] extremes and because ‘seeing a man’ is inferior to 
‘seeing an animal’. 
(8) From this it is plain that an inference like ‘You are a good thing; 
and every good thing is a good cleric or non-cleric10; therefore, you are a good 15 
cleric or a good non-cleric’11 is not valid. [For] although it follows12: ‘You are a 
thing; therefore, you are a cleric or non-cleric’, nevertheless it does not follow: 
‘You are a good thing; therefore, you are a good cleric or a good non-cleric’.13 
For ‘You are a good thing’ is not inferior to ‘You are a good or non-good cleric’. 
This is plain because when I say ‘You are a good thing’, the [word] ‘thing’ that I 20 
say does not have supposition, because it is a part of the extreme.14 
(9) Likewise, the inference ‘You are Socrates’s pupil; and every15 pupil is 
a man; therefore, you are Socrates’s man’ is not valid. Neither is it valid: ‘You are 
Socrates’s something; and you are nothing [else] but a cleric16; therefore, you are 
Socrates’s cleric’. For positing that you were Socrates’s master, the antecedent 25 
would be true and the consequent false. This inference is defective, because 
                                                 
8The preposition in both the antecedent and the consequent is ‘ad’, so that the only 
difference between the two propositions in Latin is in the participle. The second proposition 
is just a verbose way of saying that you are already at the inn. 
9‘Is inferior to’ = (roughly) is narrower than, is contained under. The idea is that 
running implies existing, but not the reverse. 
10Omitting Brown’s editorial addition ‘bonus’. 
11Omitting an ‘es’ in the edition. 
12Conjecturing ‘sequatur’ for the edition’s ‘sequantur’. 
13Omitting an ‘es’ in the edition. 
14I can make no sense of the example as it stands in the edition. The apparatus to the 
edition records several serious variants, suggesting that the scribes couldn’t make sense of it 
either. I have fixed things up as best I can. Nevertheless, even fixed up, the example does not 
illustrate at all the same point as the preceding example, despite what Burley seems to be 
suggesting in the penultimate sentence. In the previous example, it was a question whether 
the inferential relations between terms are preserved when those terms are embedded in larger 
expressions. Here it is a question whether adjectives can be distributed over disjunction. 
15Following a variant in the edition. 
16The ‘nothing [else] but’ seems too strong here. It is open to the rejoinder: “Oh yes I 
am. I’m also Socrates’s master.” (See the sentence following the inference.) 
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when I say ‘You are Socrates’s something’, the term ‘something’, insofar as it is 
a part of the extreme, does not have supposition. 
(10) For this reason too, (p. 33) ‘You are Socrates’s something; therefore 
you are Socrates’s cleric or Socrates’s non-cleric’17 does not follow. 
(11) (1.21) But there is a doubt about extremes put together by means of 5 
conjunction or disjunction. Does a part of an extreme have supposition in such 
cases? If it is conceded that they do, then18 ‘Three men and no more than three 
men are here indoors’ would be true.19 For it would follow: ‘Three men and two 
men are here indoors; therefore, three men and no more than three are here 
indoors’, since two men are no more than three. 10 
(12) Likewise, it would have to be conceded that ‘Every man is an ani-
mal’ has three true singulars and no more.20 For it would follow: ‘It has three true 
singulars; and these are no more (pointing to two [of them]); therefore, it has 
three true singulars and no more’. 
(13) Likewise, one would have to concede that Socrates and Plato are 15 
non-Socrates and non-Plato. For it follows: ‘Socrates and Plato are Socrates and 
Plato; therefore, Socrates and Plato are non-Socrates and non-Plato’, because 
‘Plato’ is inferior to ‘non-Socrates’ and ‘Socrates’ is inferior to ‘non-Plato’. 
(14) So [too], ‘Some non-men are a man and a non-man’ would have to 
be conceded, or at least ‘Some [things]21 (p. 34) are a man and a non-man’, from 20 
which ‘Some [things] are a man and are not a man’ follows.22 
(15) (1.22) It has to be said that no part of a composite extreme has sup-
position in the composite extreme. Nevertheless, in some cases an inference does 
hold from an inferior to a superior. But this is not on account of an ordering 
between the parts of the extremes, but only on account of an ordering between 25 
the extremes [themselves]. The reply to the arguments [in (11)–(14)] is plain 
from this. 
                                                 
17Omitting an ‘es’ with a variant in the edition. See the comment on this kind of 
example, n. 14 above. 
18Following a variant in the edition. 
19The explanation in the remainder of the paragraph makes it clear that we are 
implicitly assuming that there are in fact exactly five men here indoors. 
20That is, there would be only three true propositions of the form ‘This man is an 
animal’ (pointing to different men in each case), and so only three men who were animals. In 
fact there are many more than that, and this is the point of the example. 
21‘Some [things]’ = aliqua, the neuter plural pronoun. 
22What argument Burley has in mind here is anyone’s guess. Try this: Socrates and a 
tree stump are a man and a non-man (respectively); therefore some things are a man and a 
non-man, since ‘Socrates’ is inferior to ‘thing’ and ‘tree stump’ is also inferior to ‘thing’. 
Burley’s hesitation at the beginning of the paragraph is harder to motivate. For while ‘tree 
stump’ is inferior to ‘non-man’, ‘Socrates’ definitely isn’t. Perhaps the point rests on whether 
calling a pair of things ‘non-men’ implies that neither of them is a man or only that they are 
not both men. But it is not clear how that has anything to do with whether parts of extremes 
have supposition. 
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[The definition of supposition] 
(16) (2.01) Now that we have seen that a part of an extreme does not 
supposit, we must talk about kinds of supposition. You have to know that any 
term, and whatever can be an extreme in a proposition, whether it is an adjec-
tive23 or a substantive, whether [it is] complex or incomplex, every such thing 5 
can supposit. From this it is plain that ‘the substantive designation of a thing’24 is 
not a suitable definition of supposition. For supposition belongs no more to the 
substantive than to the other.25 
(17) Therefore, it needs to be said that supposition is a property of an 
extreme according as one extreme is ordered to the other in a proposition. And so 10 
supposition does not belong to an extreme outside a proposition, but only in a 
proposition. 
[The primary division of supposition] 
(18) (2.1) Supposition is divided, because one kind is proper and another 
kind is improper. This is the first division of supposition. A term supposits 15 
properly when it supposits for something for which it is permitted to supposit 
literally.26 But a term supposits improperly when it supposits for something 
metaphorically and from its use in speech. 
(19) Now first we must talk about proper supposition, first in absolute 
[terms], then in relative ones. 20 
[The division of proper supposition] 
(20) (p. 35) (2.2) Proper supposition is divided. One kind is formal and 
another kind is material. Material supposition is when a term supposits for an 
utterance.27 This is of three kinds. For it either supposits (a) for an utterance only 
(it supposits this way in ‘Man is a monosyllable’), or (b) for an utterance together 25 
with the relation to [its] significate (it supposits this way in ‘Man is a noun’, 
because the utterance alone is not the noun, but rather the aggregate of the 
                                                 
23In Latin, neuter adjectives can (and often do) stand alone as subjects. 
24See, e.g., L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of 
Early Terminist Logic, (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962–1967), Vol. II: The Origin and Early 
Development of the Theory of Supposition, Part Two: Texts and Indices, (1967): (a) Logica 
‘Ut dicit’, Tract. VII, p. 408: “And supposition is the substantive designation of a thing, that 
is, a certain property of a substantive term”; (b) Logica ‘Cum sit nostra’, Tract. V, p. 446: 
“And supposition is the substantive designation of a thing, that is, a substantive term’s 
signification.” 
25On manuscript adds the marginal gloss ‘the adjective’. 
26‘Literally’ = de virtute sermonis = “by the force of the discourse.” 
27‘Utterance’ = vox. The translation almost always conveys the right sense, even if it 
is not very graceful. 
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utterance and the relation to the significate), or else (c) it supposits for an 
utterance together with the relation to [its] consignificate28 (it supposits like this 
in ‘Man is in the singular number, ‘Cato’s is in the possessive case’). 
(21) Yet it has to be understood that a term does not always supposit 
materially when it supposits for an utterance. For if that [were] so, then when I 5 
say ‘Every utterance is an utterance’, the subject would supposit materially, be-
cause the subject is distributed, or supposits, for the utterance ‘utterance’. 
Likewise, when I say ‘Every noun is a part of speech’, the subject would supposit 
materially, because the subject supposits for any noun at all, and so for the noun 
‘noun’. 10 
(22) Thus in some cases the thing signified by an utterance is superior to 
the signifying utterance. And in that case when such a term supposits personally, 
it supposits for an utterance. But it does not follow from this that it signifies 
materially unless it supposits for itself only, or only for itself together with the 
relation to [its] significate or consignificate. 15 
[The division of formal supposition] 
(23) (2.3) Supposition is formal when a term supposits for its sig-
nificate or for a suppositum.29 Formal supposition is divided, because one 
kind is simple and another kind personal. 
[The divisions of simple supposition] 20 
(24) Simple supposition is divided, because sometimes a term sup-
posits for its absolute significate, and sometimes for its significate [as] 
compared with [its] supposita. (p. 36) And so simple supposition is of two 
kinds. One kind is absolute, and the other kind is compared. Absolute sup-
position, as here: ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’,30 and 25 
compared supposition, as here: ‘Man is a species’. For a universal has two 
conditions. One condition of it is “being in many,” and the other is “being said 
of many.” According as a universal has “being in many,” absolute supposition 
                                                 
28For present purposes, the notion of consignification as used here is sufficiently 
illustrated by the examples that follow. 
29‘Suppositum’ has both a logical and a metaphysical usage. In the logical sense, it 
refers to whatever a term supposits for. In that sense, it is tautological to say a term supposits 
for its suppositum, and this is not what Burley means here. In the metaphysical sense of the 
term, the supposita of a term are the individuals that fall under it. (‘Supponere’ = literally, “to 
place under.”) Thus Socrates and Plato are supposita of the term ‘man’ in this sense. It is the 
latter sense that Burley has in mind here. 
30This just means that man is the worthiest creature of all. The odd wording suggests 
that the example is perhaps a literal translation of a common syntactical construction in 
Arabic. Nevertheless, I know of no discussion of this proposition in the Islamic logical 
literature. I would welcome further information on this topic. 
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belongs to it. And according as it is “said of many,” simple and compared 
supposition belongs to it. Thus, according to the one supposition ‘Man is a 
species’ is true, and according to the other ‘Man is the worthiest creature 
among creatures’ is true. Otherwise ‘The worthiest creature among creatures 
is a species’ would be true. 5 
(25) (2.31) You should know that according to simple and absolute 
supposition ‘An ox is promised to you’ is verified. Positing that someone 
promise you an ox, by saying ‘I promise you an ox’, then ‘An ox is promised 
to you’ is true. And yet neither this ox nor that one [is promised], but rather 
the thing signified by ‘ox’. And that can be delivered by delivering any 10 
suppositum indifferently. Thus whoever gives you an ox gives you the thing 
signified by the term ‘ox’. And he cannot deliver this common [significate] to 
you otherwise than in a suppositum of it. 
(26) Likewise, according to this supposition, ‘He is deprived of sight’ 
is true, pointing to a blind [person]. For he is deprived neither of my sight nor 15 
of your sight. The cause [for this] is that he is not born to have my sight or 
yours.31 Yet he is born to have the thing signified by the term ‘sight’. And 
therefore the blind [person] (p. 37) is deprived of the common [entity] “sight,” 
but is deprived neither of this sight nor that one. 
(27) (2.32) You should know that a general term having species and 20 
individuals under it can have two kinds of simple compared supposition. For it 
can have general or special supposition. When it has general [supposition], 
then it supposits for [its] significate absolutely so as not for any suppositum. 
And according to this supposition, ‘Substance is a most general genus’ is true. 
But when it has special simple supposition, then it supposits for species so as 25 
not for individuals. And in that case ‘Substance is second substance’ is true. 
Thus ‘Substance32 is second substance’ is true according as the subject has 
special simple supposition. 
[The divisions of personal supposition] 
(28) (2.4) Personal supposition is divided. For one kind is common, 30 
and another kind is discrete. Common supposition is where a common term 
supposits for some numerically one suppositum. Discrete supposition is where 
a discrete term supposits. 
(29) You should know that among discrete terms one kind is simple 
and one kind is composite. And I call33 a term “simple” not because the 35 
utterance is simple, but because it has a simple significate. In [the case of] a 
                                                 
31The expression ‘born to ’ indicates a kind of natural aptitude that may 
nevertheless fail to be actualized in practice. Colloquial English preserves the same usage in 
phrases like ‘born to lose’, ‘born to be blue’. 
32Omitting ‘first’ with a variant in the edition. 
33Following a variant in the edition. 
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discrete simple term, simple and personal supposition do not differ. Rather 
such a term suppositing simply and suppositing personally supposits for 
entirely the same [thing]. 
(30) Nevertheless, a composite discrete term supposits for one [thing] 
when it supposits simply and [another] when [it supposits] personally. For 5 
when it supposits personally, it supposits for a simple singular. But when it 
supposits simply it supposits for its significate. 
(31) For example, positing that Socrates is white and runs, ‘White 
Socrates runs’ is true according as the subject supposits personally. And in 
that case the term ‘white Socrates’ supposits for (p. 38) Socrates. And so a 10 
composite singular supposits for a simple singular.34 Thus ‘White Socrates 
runs’ is true because Socrates runs. And according to the same supposition 
‘White Socrates of necessity is Socrates’ is true. But when such a term sup-
posits simply, it supposits for its significate. And in that case ‘White Socrates 
is a being by accident’ is true. For the thing signified by the term ‘white 15 
Socrates’ is a being by accident. 
[The division of common supposition] 
(32) (2.41) Common supposition is divided. For one kind is confused 
and another kind is determinate. Determinate supposition is when a common 
term supposits distributively for its supposita, as in ‘Some man runs’. Thus I 20 
understand the same thing by “determinate supposition” and by “distributive 
supposition.”35 
[The division of confused supposition] 
(33) Confused supposition is divided. For one kind is merely confused 
supposition36 and another kind is confused and distributive. 25 
(34) A term supposits merely confusedly when it supposits for several 
things in such a way that it is implied by any of them and one can descend to 
none of them [either] copulatively or disjunctively. ‘Animal’ supposits this 
way in ‘Every man is an animal’. For it is implied by [its] supposita. For it 
follows: ‘Every man is this animal; therefore every man is an animal’. But it 30 
does not follow: “Every man is an animal; therefore every man is this animal’, 
                                                 
34That is, a composite singular term supposits for a simple singular thing. 
35The use of ‘distributive’ here is perhaps surprising. Do not confuse “distributive” 
supposition, in this sense, with “confused and distributive” supposition as described below. 
36‘Merely confused supposition’ = suppositio confuse tantum, or more commonly, 
suppositio confusa tantum. Literally, this is “supposition only confusedly” or “only confused 
supposition.” But the phrase ‘merely confused supposition’ is by now well established in the 
secondary literature, and I have retained it here. 
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and it also does not follow: ‘Every man is an animal; therefore every man is 
this animal or that one’.37 
(35) (2.411) You need to know that a syncategorema that conveys a 
multitude has the power of merely confusedly confusing a term that mediately 
follows.38 In accordance with this, it is plain that the following are true: 5 
‘Twice you ate some bread’ [and] ‘Three times you ate bread that you did not 
three times eat’.39 Neither does it follow from the latter: ‘Therefore, three 
times you ate this, which you did not three times eat, or three times you ate 
that, which you did not three times eat’. But this is true: ‘Three times you ate 
that, which you did not three times eat’.40 For once you ate that, which you 10 
did not three times eat, and another time you ate that, which you did not three 
times eat, and a third time you ate that, which you did not three times eat.41 
                                                 
37The sentence is carelessly formulated. First of all, it gives no explicit example of 
descending “copulatively”. Nevertheless, from the fact that ‘Every man is an animal; 
therefore every man is this animal’ does not follow, we know that ‘Every man is an animal; 
therefore every man is this animal and every man is that animal’, and so on, does not follow 
either. (This last is what is normally meant by “descending copulatively.”) But second, 
provided one understands the second inference in the text as implicitly continuing: ‘ 
therefore every man is this animal or that one’ and so on for all animals, that inference does 
follow. What doesn’t follow, and what Burley presumably means here instead, is ‘Every man 
is an animal; therefore every man is this animal or every man is that animal’, and so on for all 
animals. Ockham (and some other authors) make a sharp distinction between descending to a 
disjunction of propositions and descending to a disjoint term. See Paul Vincent Spade, “The 
Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent,” in Norman 
Kretzmann, ed., Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, (“Synthese Historical 
Library,” vol. 32; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 187224. As discussed 
there, the appeal to disjoint terms is by no means an Ockhamist innovation; it is found in fact 
long before Burley. Nevertheless, Burley routinely uses disjoint terms where it is obvious that 
he intends the longer disjunctive propositions. (See, e.g., nn. 43, 48 and 50, below.) This fact 
suggests that he is merely speaking in abbreviated fashion, and that the notion of disjoint 
terms is simply not on his mind at all. 
38‘A term that mediately follows’: That is, a term that follows, but is not the first 
term that follows. Part of the point here is that the scope of operators always extends to their 
right. This is sometimes just as artificial in Latin as it sounds in English, and yet it is a 
convention that lives on in modern symbolic notation (reverse Polish notation excepted). 
Although this convention is often applied quite rigorously in mediaeval logic, Burley does not 
always observe it strictly. See, e.g., n. 54 below. 
39The point is that twice (or three times) you ate (different pieces of) bread, even 
though there is no piece of bread that you ate more than once. The logical point is well taken, 
but perhaps it is best not to visualize the example too vividly. 
40Again, this is carelessly put. If it is true, then the consequent of the preceding 
example is true too. Burley’s point is presumably not that the preceding inference is invalid 
even though both the antecedent and the consequent are true. Matters can perhaps be fixed 
by deleting an ‘illud’ in the Latin, and translating the last sentence: “But this is true: ‘Three 
times you ate what you did not three times eat.’” But this does not conform to the wording in 
the explanation that follows. 
41The three ‘that’s here refer to distinct things you ate. 
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(36)  Now it is plain that this [claim42] is true, because otherwise 
‘Twice you ran’ would be false. For it follows: ‘Twice you ran; therefore, (p. 
39) twice you ran a run’. Therefore, unless the adverb ‘twice’ had the power 
of confusing the term that follows, it follows: ‘Twice you ran a run; therefore, 
twice you ran this run or that one’,43 which nevertheless is not true. 5 
(37) From this it is plain that ‘Every head does what does not have 
every head have’.44 For the first [occurrence of ‘head’] supposits merely 
confusedly.45 The truth of this is plain, because each singular is true.46 
(38) (2.412)  It needs to be understood that when a syncategorema that 
conveys a multitude is part of an extreme, it does not then have the power of 10 
merely confusedly confusing a common term that mediately follows [it]. For 
example, when I say ‘[One who] sees every man is an animal’, ‘animal’ does 
not stand merely confusedly in this [proposition]. This is because ‘every’47 is 
a part of the extreme. 
(39) Now it is plain that ‘animal’ does not stand merely confusedly [in 15 
this proposition]. For it follows: ‘[One who] sees every man is an animal; 
therefore [one who] sees every man is this animal or that one’, and so on.48 
That it does follow is plain. For it follows: ‘[One who] sees every man is an 
animal; therefore an animal is [one who] sees every man’. And further: 
‘Therefore this animal is [one who] sees every man or that animal is [one 20 
who] sees every animal’, and so on.49 
(40) (2.413) Furthermore, it is plain that this inference is not valid: 
‘Whenever some species existed, some suppositum of it existed then; there-
                                                 
42At the beginning of paragraph (35). 
43What Burley means is ‘Twice you ran a run; therefore, twice you ran this run or 
twice you ran that one’, and so on. See n. 37 above. 
44I’m sorry, but a lot depends on the word order in the Latin. The sense is that every 
head is such that something that does not have every head has it. (This is because nothing has 
every head; we each have our own heads, thank you very much.) 
45Although what Burley says is correct, it is not clear how it is supposed to be plain 
(as he also says) on the basis of the claim at the beginning of paragraph (35). For the first 
occurrence of ‘head’ in the example does not mediately follow any syncategorematic term 
conveys a multitude. The only word it follows is ‘every’, and it follows that immediately, not 
mediately. 
46That is, given that nothing has all heads at once, and ruling out decapitations, each 
proposition of the form ‘This head does what does not have every head have’ is true. (It 
amounts to ‘This head is had by something that does not have every head’.) 
47Conjecturing ‘omnem’ for the edition’s ‘homo’, which does not fit the example. 
The edition shows no variants here. 
48Although this inference is valid, in order to make his point Burley needs to say that 
it follows: ‘[One who] sees every man is an animal; therefore [one who] sees every man is 
this animal or one who sees every man is that one’, and so on. See n. 37 above. 
49To make this work, one needs the implicit premise that propositions of the form 
‘One who sees every man is this animal’ are “equivalent” (in a suitably strong  sense) to the 
converse ‘This animal is one who sees every man’. Such an  equivalence seems 
unobjectionable. 
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fore whenever some species existed, this or that suppositum of it existed 
then50; but ‘Always the species (p. 40) man existed’ is true51; therefore always 
some suppositum of man existed’.52 And each of ‘Always this suppositum of 
man existed’ and ‘Always that suppositum of man existed’, and so on, is false. 
For a multitude is conveyed by ‘always’, for which reason a mediately 5 
following term is confused merely confusedly.53 
(41) From this it is also plain that if in each instant of this day some 
man is here indoors, in such a way that one man is here indoors for the whole 
day,54 but different ones successively, so that now one and then another, 
[then] ‘For the whole day some man is here indoors’ is true and ‘Some man 10 
for the whole day is here indoors’ is false. 
(42) (2.414) You have to know that if a syncategorema that conveys a 
multitude has the power of confusing a term in the same categorical, nev-
ertheless a syncategorema that conveys a multitude and occurs in one cate-
gorical does not have the power of confusing a term occurring in another 15 
categorical. When I say ‘Every man is an animal and some man is he’, the term 
‘man’ occurring in the second categorical is not confused by the preceding 
quantifier, and therefore the whole [proposition] is false on account of the 
second part. 55 
(43) Likewise, neither does a universal negative quantifier occurring in 20 
one categorical have the power of confusing a term occurring in another 
categorical. Thus when I say ‘No man is an ass and some animal runs’, the 
term ‘animal’ occurring in the second categorical has determinate supposition. 
[The division of confused and distributive supposition] 
(44) (p. 41) (2.42) Confused and distributive supposition is divided. 25 
For one kind is mobile and another kind immobile. [It is] mobile when a 
                                                 
50Rather, ‘therefore whenever some species existed, this suppositum of it existed 
then or that suppositum of it existed then,’ and so on. See n. 37 above. 
51At least according to Aristotle. 
52To fit the first part of the inference, one would have expected ‘therefore always 
this or that suppositum of man existed’, interpreted as ‘therefore always this suppositum of 
man existed or always that suppositum of man existed’, and so on. See n. 50 above. 
53This doesn’t explain why each of the singulars in the preceding sentence is false, as 
Burley’s wording suggests, but rather why they don’t follow from ‘Always some suppositum 
of man existed’. 
54According to the convention about scope mentioned in n. 38 above, one would 
have expected a different wording here: ‘for the whole day one man is here indoors’. In fact 
Burley puts it exactly like this later in the sentence. 
55The example is confusing, and I am not sure exactly what Burley intends here. But 
I suspect ‘he’ in ‘some man is he’ should be ‘it’ (‘istud’ for ‘iste’), with ‘animal’ as the 
antecedent. The edition shows no variants here. Against this reading, however, note that in 
(2.615 — not translated here) Burley explicitly says that the subject of the second categorical 
does have merely confused supposition. 
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common term has supposition and the power of distributing and one can 
descend to some suppositum of it.56 [It is] immobile when a common term 
supposits for its supposita and one cannot descend to these supposita. The 
term ‘man’ supposits in the latter way in ‘Every man besides Socrates runs’. 
For the term ‘man’ is distributed, and one cannot descend to a suppositum. 5 
For ‘Every man besides Socrates runs; therefore Plato besides Socrates runs’ 
does not follow.57 
(45) Thus you need to know that when one cannot descend to the 
supposita under a term that has supposita, and neither is the term that has 
supposita implied by [its] supposita, then the term supposits confusedly and58 10 
distributively immobily. This is plain in the example given above, or in ‘No 
man besides one of these is an animal’, pointing to all men. In this 
[proposition] the term ‘animal’ supposits confusedly and distributively im-
mobily, because it neither is implied by [its] supposita nor implies them. It 
does not imply them, because ‘No man besides one of these is an animal; 15 
therefore no man besides one of these is an ass’ does not follow.59 Neither 
does ‘No man besides one of these is an ass; therefore no man besides one of 
these is an animal’ follow.60 For if it did, it would follow: ‘No animal besides 
one of these is a man; therefore no animal besides one of these is a substance’. 
Yet there the antecedent is true and the consequent false.61 20 
                                                 
56Following a variant reading in the edition. 
57The point is not that it doesn’t follow that Plato runs, but rather that ‘Plato besides 
Socrates runs’ is not well-formed. 
58‘Confusedly and’: Following a variant reading in the edition. 
59In order to understand the example, you need to realize that (pointing to all men) 
‘No man besides one of these is an ass’, according to Burley, amounts to ‘No man other than 
one of these is an ass and one of these is an ass’. That is, an “exceptive” proposition does not 
merely stand neutral on the exceptional cases; it says of them the opposite of what it says 
about the others. See Burley’s De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior, Tract. 2, pars 3, 
particula 2, Ch. 2, in Walter Burleigh: De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior, with a 
Revised Edition of the Tractatus brevior, Philoetheus Boehner, ed., (“Franciscan Institute 
Publications,” Text Series no. 9; St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), p. 
165.23–33. 
60This confirms the claim that the confusedly and distributively immobily 
suppositing term is not implied by its supposita. Note that both the antecedent and the 
consequent are false here (and in fact impossible), for the reason given in n. 59 above. The 
claim that the inference is invalid is puzzling, since Burley explicitly accepts the rule “From 
the impossible anything follows.” See his De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior, Tract. 2, 
pars 1, Ch. 1, p. 61.6–16. He does, however, say there that such inferences are generally 
“accidental” and not “natural simple inferences,” since the antecedent does not “include” the 
consequent. (Inclusion here appears to be some kind of relevance relation.) See the remainder 
of the paragraph here for why Burley thinks the inference is invalid. 
61The ‘these’ in the example can be taken as indicating all animals, or as indicating 
any group of animals provided that all men are included. Note that, unlike the preceding 
example, the antecedent of this inference is true but the consequent false. (See n. 59 above.) 
Burley’s reasoning seems to be that if the previous inference were valid, it could only be 
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[Mobile confused and distributive supposition] 
(46) (2.421) About confused and distributive mobile supposition, you 
need to know that a term does not always supposit confusedly and dis-
tributively mobily when one can descend to the supposita, unless this is by 
reason of a distribution. For it follows: ‘Some proposition (p. 42) is true; 5 
therefore this proposition is true’, pointing to ‘Something is true’.62 And so 
[too] for anything that follows from ‘Some proposition is true’. And yet the 
subject of ‘Some proposition is true’ does not supposit confusedly and dis-
tributively, because the descent does not come about on account of a distri-
bution but from a necessity in the thing. Thus, supposition is never confused 10 
and distributive unless this is by reason of a distribution.63 
(47) (2.422) Thus, mobile confused and distributive supposition is 
when by reason of a distribution one can descend to some suppositum. Dis-
tribution is conveyed by a universal affirmative quantifier, and also by syn-
categoremata and by other [expressions] that include an exercised negation. 15 
Thus the verb ‘differs’ has the power of confusing a term confusedly and 
distributively. 
(48) (2.423) But there is a doubt about a term that supposits confus-
edly and distributively mobily. Can one descend to [just] any suppositum of 
the term64? It seems not, because — pointing to Socrates and Plato — ‘Either 20 
of these, if it is Socrates, differs from Plato’ is true, taking this as being about 
a conditioned subject. This subject is said truly of each of these, because each 
is one of these, if it is Socrates. And yet one cannot descend to [just] any one, 
because in that case it would follow: ‘Either of these, if it is Socrates, differs 
from Plato; therefore, each one differs from Plato’. 25 
                                                                                                                               
because of the relation of inferior to superior between the predicate terms of the antecedent 
and the consequent. But that such a relation is not enough is shown by the last example. 
Therefore the previous inference is invalid. 
62Omitting several words in the edition, following a variant reading. As it stands, the 
edition has: “For it follows ‘Some proposition is true; therefore this proposition is true’, 
pointing to ‘Some proposition is true’. Likewise, it follows: ‘Some proposition is true’, 
pointing to ‘Something is true.” (I have italicized the words included in the edition but 
omitted in the variant.) Brown has the variant marked as a homoeoteleuton, but I think the 
text makes better sense without the words. For note that despite the italicized ‘Likewise it 
follows’ above, the subsequent words are not an inference. Perhaps we could construe the 
‘Likewise it follows’ as meaning that what follows is a consequent of the same antecedent as 
before. That would be technically correct, since the sentence just repeats the antecedent. But 
note also that there is no demonstrative to do the “pointing” in ‘Some proposition is true’. It 
may be possible to sort all this out, but I think it is much more plausible to follow the variant 
reading and just omit the italicized words entirely. 
63Note that the beginning of the of the paragraph was about mobile confused and 
distributive supposition. Although the restriction to mobile supposition has been dropped, it is 
presumably still implicitly understood. 
64That is, to each and every one of them. 
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(49) Likewise it follows65: ‘Either of these, if it is Socrates, differs 
from a white thing; therefore each one differs from a white thing’.66 For each 
is one of these, if it is Socrates. 
(50) (p. 43) (2.424) It must be said that the whole [expression] ‘either 
of these, if it is Socrates’ cannot be distributed by the quantifier ‘either’.67 5 
Neither is a term distributable by the quantifier ‘either’ unless it has two 
supposita only. And even then not.68 For a69 term that has two supposita only 
can<not> be distributed by the quantifier ‘either’, unless these supposita are 
pointed to in its distributable, as in ‘Either of these runs’, pointing to Socrates 
and Plato. Thus ‘either of these, if it is Socrates’, is not to be understood — 10 
unless only ‘being of these’ is distributed.70 
(51) (2.425) You have to know that a universal affirmative quantifier 
confuses an immediately following term confusedly and distributively, and it 
confuses a mediately following term merely confusedly. But a universal 
negative quantifier has the power of confusing both a mediately following 15 
term and a term immediately following it confusedly and distributively. Thus 
when I say ‘No man is an animal’, both ‘man’ and ‘animal’ supposit 
confusedly and distributively. 
(52) But it has to be understood that this rule is to be understood [as 
holding] when the universal negative quantifier is referred to the formal 20 
composition. But when it is negates a material composition only, it does not 
have the power of confusing the extremes of the formal composition, as when 
I say ‘No man’s running is a truth’. Taking this in the composite sense, the 
term ‘true’ is not confused. For it does not follow: ‘No man’s running is a 
truth; therefore no man’s running is this truth “God exists”’, because the 25 
antecedent is possible and the consequent impossible.71 
                                                 
65That is, it follows if we can descend to each and every suppositum. Apparently we 
are still pointing to Socrates and Plato. 
66Suppose Socrates is black and Plato white.  
67The first ‘either’ is ‘alterum’ in the Latin, whereas the second is ‘uterque’. In fact, 
the preceding example had ‘uterque’. I am assuming that nothing rests on this slight 
difference of wording. Burley is in effect here denying that we have a case of confused and 
distributive mobile supposition, so that the examples in (48)–(49) are no evidence against the 
claim that in such supposition one can descend to each and every suppositum. 
68That is, even that is not enough. 
69Omitting an ‘uterque’ from the edition. I can make no sense of it here. 
70The entire paragraph is obscure, but I confess I can make no sense of the end of it. 
The business about ‘being of these’ apparently means that we are to understand ‘either of 
these, if it is Socrates’ in the sense of ‘either being of these [i.e., either being among these], if 
it is Socrates’. But what difference that should make I do not know. Also, why are the two 
supposita of ‘these’ not “pointed to” in ‘either of these, if it is Socrates’, whereas they are in 
‘Either of these runs’? 
71‘No man’s running is a truth’ = Nullum hominem currere est verum. The example 
is hard to translate well, since it relies crucially on Latin syntax. Latin routinely uses 
accusative-plus-infinitive constructions (such as ‘nullum hominem currere’) in indirect 
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discourse. English typically uses a ‘that’-clause (‘That no man runs is a truth’), but sometimes 
also the accusative-plus-infinitive construction (‘They want him to leave’) or an accusative-
plus-infinitive construction introduced by ‘for’ (‘It is desirable for him to leave’). But in the 
present case, in order to see the point of the example, we need to have the universal negative 
quantifier ‘no’ at the very beginning of the sentence, as in the Latin. That yields two possible 
readings: (1) No man’s running is a truth = it is true that no man is running, or (2) No man’s 
running is a truth = the truths do not include even a single case of a man’s running. The 
former reading is the “composite sense”; the subject term is ‘no man’s running’, and the ‘no’ 
there is part of the subject term, not a quantifier added to the subject term. The proposition is 
therefore a singular (or perhaps indefinite) affirmative. The latter reading is the “divided 
sense” (although Burley does not discuss that sense here); the subject term is ‘man’s running’ 
or ‘(a) man’s running’, and the ‘no’ is now read as a quantifier added to the subject term, not 
as part of that subject term. The proposition is therefore a universal negative. The “formal 
composition” in a proposition is the composition of the main subject with the main predicate. 
In addition, some propositions have a further “material” composition — that is, an embedded 
subject-predicate composition within the subject or the predicate of the whole proposition. In 
the “composite” reading of ‘Nullum hominem currere est verum’, the formal composition is 
between ‘nullum hominem currere’ (the subject) and ‘verum’ (the predicate); the material 
composition is between ‘hominem’ and ‘currere’ within the main proposition’s subject. 
Burley’s point in this paragraph, therefore, is that when a universal quantifier negates a 
material composition only (as in the “composite” reading of the example-sentence), it does 
not confuse the other extreme, since the whole proposition is not made negative by that 
quantifier. But when it negates the formal composition, it does confuse the other extreme, 
since then it does make the whole proposition negative. 
